

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 146920
ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:ACDA/D/ES:MSVANCE

APPROVED BY:ACDA/D/ES:MSVANCE

S/S-O:JETOBIN

-----010975 092212Z /61

P 091843Z JUN 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 146920

EXDIS USSALTTWO FOR SALTDEL

FOLLOWING REPEAT BONN 10422 ACTION SECSTATE INFO LONDON
MBFR VIENNA USNATO USNMR USCINCEUR JUN 7

QUOTE S E C R E T BONN 10422

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT: FRG ARMS CONTROL COMMISSIONER RUTH COMMENTS ON
NEGOTIATIONS

REF: STUTE 123871

BEGIN SUMMARY

DURING A LONG REVIEW OF THE CURRENT STATE OF ARMS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 146920

CONTROL AND ITS PROSPECTS, FRG ARMS CONTROL COMMISSIONER
RUTH EXPRESSED THE FEELING THAT THE MOST IMMEDIATE IM-
PORTANT GOAL TO BE ACHIEVED IN THE MBFR TALKS WAS A
SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF THE DATA DISCUSSION. ON THE
OTHER HAND, RUTH OBSERVED THAT OTHER TOPICS COULD PER-
HAPS BEST BE HANDLED IN OTHER FORA, LIKE THE EUROPEAN CON-
FERENCE PROPOSED BY THE FRENCH OR LIKE SOME GRAY AREA

NEGOTIATIONS ARRANGEMENT. END SUMMARY.

MBFR

1. DURING A LONG AND RELATIVELY INFORMAL REVIEW WITH THE POLITICAL COUNSELOR ON THE CURRENT STATE OF ARMS CONTROL TALKS, FRG ARMS CONTROL COMMISSIONER RUTH SAID HE BELIEVED THE MBFR TALKS WERE NOW AT AN IMPORTANT JUNCTURE. HE SAID THE DATA DISCUSSION WAS VITAL BECAUSE IT COULD SHOW HOW GENUINE REDUCTIONS COULD BE MADE WITHOUT THREATENING THE SECURITY OF THE PARTICIPANTS. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO DEFINE CATEGORIES AS CLEARLY AS POSSIBLE. HE EXPRESSED SOME UNCERTAINTY ABOUT HOW THE SOVIETS COULD GET OUT OF THE TRAP WHICH THEY HAD SET FOR THEMSELVES BY INSISTING THAT PARITY ALREADY EXISTED, BUT HE THOUGHT A SOLUTION MIGHT EMERGE AS THE DISCUSSION FOCUSED MORE CLEARLY ON SEPARATE CATEGORIES BECAUSE THAT DISCUSSION WOULD THEN SHOW WHAT THE SOVIETS HAD LEFT OUT.

2. RUTH SAID THAT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S REMARK IN AN EARLIER INTERVIEW THAT ONE DID NOT NEED ABSOLUTE ACCURACY IN THE DATA DISCUSSION MEANT THAT ONE NEED NOT WORRY ABOUT HAVING PARITY IN EACH AND EVERY CATEGORY AND AT EACH AND EVERY LEVEL. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS TO ESTABLISH GENERAL PARITY AND, OF COURSE, OVERALL
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 146920

BALANCE.

3. RUTH MADE CLEAR THAT THE FRG WOULD CONTINUE TO FOCUS CLOSELY ON MBFR. AT THE SAME TIME HE CONVEYED THE SENSE THAT THE GERMANS SEE THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AS A FORUM NOW CONCENTRATED PARTICULARLY ON ONE ISSUE, THE DATA QUESTION.

THE EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

4. IN THAT CONTEXT, RUTH OBSERVED, THE NEW FRENCH PROPOSAL WAS VERY IMPORTANT. HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT IN PART BECAUSE THE FRENCH HAD MADE THE PROPOSAL AND THUS HAD ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF ARMS CONTROL.

5. MORE IMPORTANT FROM THE GERMAN STANDPOINT, RUTH OBSERVED, WAS THAT THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR THE FIRST TIME GAVE THE GERMANS AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEAL WITH ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN A GEOGRAPHIC FRAMEWORK THAT MADE THE CONCEPT MANAGEABLE FOR THEM (SEE REFTEL). THUS, RUTH SAID, THE GERMANS SEE THE FRENCH NEGOTIATION FORUM AS RUNNING PERHAPS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH MBFR, BUT FOCUSED

ON STABILIZING MEASURES RATHER THAN ON THE CONCRETE DATA QUESTION THAT WOULD STILL BE HANDLED IN MBFR.

6. RUTH DID NOT INDICATE ANY GREAT INTEREST IN ANY OTHER ASPECTS OF THE FRENCH PROPOSAL, SUCH AS THE SATELLITE STATION.

7. RUTH SAID THAT AT THIS POINT IT APPEARED THAT THE FRENCH WOULD RELY ON BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS IN ORDER TO DECIDE ON THE NEXT STEP IN THEIR PLAN. HE THOUGHT THAT, ONCE ENOUGH COUNTRIES INDICATED AN INTEREST IN A EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, THE FRENCH WOULD PROBABLY PROCEED FORMALLY TO INVITE THE APPROPRIATE NATIONS TO SUCH A CONFERENCE. OF COURSE, HE SAID, THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 146920

UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO PARTICIPATE IF THE CONFERENCES WERE TO ACHIEVE ANYTHING.

8. RUTH SAID THAT SUCH REPORTS AS HE HAD HEARD INDICATED THAT THE POLES HAD SHOWN AN INTEREST IN THE FRENCH CONFERENCE PROPOSAL BUT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN VERY RESERVED. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE FINAL EAST EUROPEAN POSITIONS WOULD BE.

GRAY AREA SYSTEMS

9. RUTH SAID THE FRG REMAINED VERY INTERESTED IN PROCEEDING TOWARD SOME NEGOTIATION ON THE EUROPEAN GRAY AREA SYSTEMS. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THAT AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF SUCH A NEGOTIATION SHOULD BE ACCEPTANCE BY THE SOVIETS OF THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF UNIFIED DEFENSE. HOWEVER, HE WAS NOT YET SURE HOW THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE STRUCTURED TO REFLECT THIS CONCEPT AND TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOT DEAL SEPARATELY WITH ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN DEFENSE SYSTEM.

10. IN THIS CONNECTION, RUTH SAID HE HAD NO FINAL INFORMATION AS TO WHETHER THE BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS COULD BE CONSIDERED IN SUCH A CONFERENCE. HE HAD NOTED THAT PRIME MINISTER CALLAHAN HAD INDICATED BRITISH INTEREST IN A GRAY AREA NEGOTIATION, BUT HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS MEANT THAT LONDON WOULD BE PREPARED TO PUT ITS OWN SYSTEMS ON THE BARGAINING TABLE. AS FOR THE FRENCH, HE SAID HE HAD NO GOOD INFORMATION.

11. RUTH NOTED THAT AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN GERMAN THINKING WOULD BE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE GRAY AREA SYSTEMS SHOULD ALSO BE REGARDED AS STRATEGIC IN THEIR
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 146920

OWN RIGHT. HE SAID THAT GENSCHER HAD RECENTLY OBSERVED THAT CERTAIN TYPES OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, WHETHER INTER-CONTINENTAL OR CONTINENTAL, WERE ALL STRATEGIC EVEN THOUGH THEY MIGHT BE MORE THREATENING TO SOME COUNTRIES THAN TO OTHERS.

12. RUTH ALSO SAID THAT HE FELT THAT THE GRAY AREA SYSTEMS TALKS SHOULD BE TIED IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER TO THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE THEY, LIKE THE SALT TALKS, SHOULD DEAL WITH STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NO CLEAR CONCEPT AT THIS POINT ON HOW THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE RELATED.

13. IN A GENERAL VEIN, RUTH APPEARED OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECT FOR ACTIVE ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED TO NOTE AT THE UNSSOD THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WERE LOOKING AT THESE ISSUES MUCH MORE REALISTICALLY THAN BEFORE, AND WERE MUCH LESS INCLINED TO FALL INTO SOVIET PROPAGANDA TRAPS. HE WAS ALSO ENCOURAGED THAT WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO HOLD THE NATO SUMMIT AT THE SAME TIME AS THE SSOD, THUS UNDERLING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY NEEDS. HE ENVISAGED THE POSSIBILITY THAT IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE THERE MIGHT BE A WIDE RANGE OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS PROCEEDING SIMULTANEOUSLY, EACH DEALING WITH A SEPARATE TOPIC. IN PASSING, HE OBSERVED THAT ONE OF THE PRINCIPLE REQUIREMENTS OF ARMS CONTROL WOULD BE TO DEVELOP THE CONCEPTS AND THE MECHANICS BY WHICH THESE VARIOUS NEGOTIATIONS, OFTEN INVOLVING DIFFERENT PARTICIPANTS, COULD BE BEST RELATED IN A CONCEPTUAL AND AN OPERATIONAL SENSE. STESSEL. UNQUOTE VANCE

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARMS, NEGOTIATIONS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, FORCE & TROOP LEVELS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 jun 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE146920
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: ACDA/D/ES:MSVANCE
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780242-0468
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780675/aaaacmhu.tel
Line Count: 206
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 1ac1428c-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 78 STUTTGART 123871
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2411019
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: FRG ARMS CONTROL COMMISSIONER RUTH COMMENTS ON NEGOTIATIONS
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
To: GENEVA
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/1ac1428c-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014